Background: Physician-assisted suicide (PAS) laws have been enacted in five US States and, along with physician-administered euthanasia, in Canada and the Netherlands.
Introduction
In the US States of Oregon and Washington its the 'Death with Dignity' Act. In California and Colorado its the 'End of Life Options' Act and in Vermont the 'Patient Choice at the End of Life' Act. These are the titles of laws in five US States which allow doctors to supply lethal drugs to seriously ill people who request them and who are thought to meet certain criteria so that they can use those drugs to take their own lives. In other words, these are laws legalizing physician-assisted suicide (PAS). In the UK there is no such law. Both the Westminster and Holyrood Parliaments have rejected a succession of Private Member 'assisted dying' bills (as they are called by their proponents) by substantial majorities.
PAS has also been legalized in the Netherlands (2001) and Canada (2016) , though as one component of wider-ranging laws permitting not only PAS but also physician-administered euthanasia (PAE), in which a doctor administers rather than prescribes or supplies lethal drugs to a requesting patient.
Switzerland is commonly, but mistakenly, thought to have legalized assisted suicide. Switzerland has an exception to its criminal code exempting such assistance from prosecution if it can be shown to have been given for non-self-serving reasons. This exemption, which dates from 1942, was not framed in the context of serious illness but was a civil libertarian measure. Nor does it embed assisted suicide within clinical practice. In Switzerland assistance with suicide is usually provided by 'right to die' organizations.
This article discusses PAS in those US jurisdictions where it has been legalized. The criteria in these jurisdictions are broadly similar-an applicant must be terminally ill with a prognosis of 6 months or less of life remaining, acting voluntarily and without pressure, and mentally capable. The criteria for PAS in Canada and the Netherlands are less clearly defined and need to be seen within the context of the wider-ranging laws of which they are a part. The specific focus of this article is on Oregon. This is partly because Oregon has had a PAS law in place for longer than elsewhere and, in consequence, more evidence of its operation is available and partly because Oregon is the model of campaigners for legalization of 'assisted dying' in Britain.
Oregon

The law
Oregon's Death with Dignity Act (DWDA (The Act is known formally as ORS (Oregon Revised Statute) 127.800 to 127.890, 127.895 and 127.897. References to the Act in footnotes use the formal ORS title, with the relevant section number shown.) was passed in 1994. It was the result of a Citizens' Initiative, meaning that it was proposed by individuals (rather than by the State Legislature) and voted on by the State electorate. The proposed law secured the narrowest of majorities (51%) and its implementation was delayed for 3 years by a court injunction. In 1997, after securing 60% of votes in a second ballot, the Act became law.
The DWDA permits doctors to prescribe lethal drugs to terminally ill patients who are considered to meet certain criteria. Under the Act an application for PAS may be made by 'an adult who is capable, is a resident of Oregon, and has been determined by the attending physician and consulting physician to be suffering from a terminal disease, and who has voluntarily expressed his or her wish to die' (ORS 127.805 Section 2.01). He or she must make an oral and a written request and reiterate the former no less than 15 days after making the initial oral request.
An applicant's written request must be witnessed by two people who attest that 'to the best of their knowledge and belief the patient is capable, acting voluntarily and is not being coerced to sign the request' (ORS 127.810 Section 2.02). The attending physician (defined as a doctor with 'primary responsibility for the care of the patient and treatment of the patient's terminal disease' (ORS 127.800 Section 1(01)(2))) must make the diagnosis and prognosis, inform the patient of his or her clinical situation, provide information on alternative treatments and decide whether the patient is mentally capable and making the request voluntarily. The consulting physician (defined as a doctor 'qualified by specialty or experience to make a professional diagnosis and prognosis regarding the patient's disease' (ORS 127.800 Section 1(01)(4))) must examine the patient and his or her medical records and confirm the various judgements that the attending doctor has made.
The Act states (ORS 127.825, Section 3.03):
'If in the opinion of the attending physician or the consulting physician a patient may be suffering from a psychiatric or psychological disorder or depression causing impaired judgement, either physician shall refer the patient for counseling'.
'Counseling' is defined as 'one or more consultations as necessary between a state-licensed psychiatrist and a patient' (ORS 127.800, Section 1(01)(5)). If the stated conditions are considered to be met, it falls to the attending doctor to prescribe lethal drugs and to report that he or she has done so. The Act requires the Oregon Department of Human Services to 'review a sample of records' (ORS 127.865, Section 3.11(1)) and to 'generate and make available to the public an annual statistical report ' (ORS 127, 865, Section 3.11(3) ). From 2009 this function has been the responsibility of the Oregon Health Authority (OHA).
The annual reports
There have been 19 annual reports published by what is now the OHA covering the years 1998-2016. Figure 1 , which is taken from the 2016 report (Published in February 2017) , shows the number of prescriptions for lethal drugs issued in each year and the number of deaths resulting from their ingestion.
It will be noted that the number of deaths in each year is less than the number of prescriptions issued. This is because some recipients (around one in three over the lifetime of the DWDA) do not take the drugs supplied to them but die from natural causes. It can be argued that supplying lethal drugs does not necessarily result in PAS but offers the prospect of an escape route if the patient feels his or her medical condition has become intolerable. Others might argue that, given the (sometimes considerable) lapse of time between prescription and ingestion, the criteria on which the drugs were prescribed (for example, having decision-making capacity or being free from pressure) may no longer be fulfilled when they come to be taken.
Another notable feature is the trend in numbers of deaths from PAS. Until 2013 the annual number of deaths from PAS was variable but generally upwards. This was followed by a sharp rise in 2014 and 2015 and a slight decline in 2016-though, as the latest report makes clear, there remains a relatively large number cases where prescriptions for lethal drugs were issued in 2016 but, as at the January 23, 2017 cut-off point, the OHA had no information as to whether or not they had led to PAS. Over the 3 years from 2013 to 2016 the annual number of deaths rose by 82%.
In 2016 just under 90% of applicants gave as their reason for seeking PAS being 'less able to engage in activities making life enjoyable': the same number cited 'losing autonomy'. Poor pain control came well down the list, cited by 35%. Forty nine per cent were concerned about being a burden on their families, friends or caregivers.
Issues
What do the data in the reports tell us about Oregon's experience of PAS? The reports are, as the statute requires, statistical analyses. They state how many people have died by PAS, what were their underlying medical conditions, how old they were and so on. These data enable us to make some inferences about the operation of the law, but they do not tell us how requests for PAS are being handled-in particular, how thorough are the investigations made by the doctors who consider them and in what circumstances ingestion of prescribed lethal drugs takes place. A fundamental problem here is the absence of an independent qualitative audit system. A doctor who has prescribed lethal drugs is required to submit the relevant documentation to the OHA, but there is no body charged specifically with scrutinizing the quality of the assessment process.
Vulnerability
Various research studies have been conducted since enactment of the DWDA to consider different aspects of the working of the law. One such study (Legal physician-assisted dying in Oregon and the Netherlands: evidence concerning the impact on patients in 'vulnerable' groups. Battin, MP et al, Journal of Medical Ethics 2007; 33: 591-597) investigated the prevalence of PAS among various socio-economic groups, including the elderly, the poor, the less-well-educated, women and racial minorities. It 'found no evidence to justify the grave and important concern often expressed about the potential for abuse-namely, the fear that legalized physician-assisted dying will target the vulnerable or pose the greatest risk to people in vulnerable groups'. A riposte (Legal physician-assisted suicide in Oregon and The Netherlands: evidence concerning the impact on patients in vulnerable groupsanother perspective on Oregon's data, Finlay, I and George, R, Journal of Medical Ethics 2011; 37:-171-174) in the same journal pointed out that this conclusion rested on a questionable methodology. For example, the conclusion that the elderly were not at heightened risk had been reached by measuring the death rate from PAS among persons aged 85 or over with that of persons aged 18-64. Those aged 65-84, a group whom most would regard as elderly, had been excluded. Yet, as the official reports make clear, this latter group accounts for more than half of all deaths from PAS. The latest report gives the median age for PAS as 73 years.
There were also conclusions which may perhaps have been valid in themselves but raised questions. For example, the study observed that 'terminally ill college graduates were 7.6 times more likely to die with physician assistance than those without a high school diploma', from which the conclusion was drawn that there was no heightened risk to persons of low educational status. This may possibly be so, but it begs the question: are those with higher educational attainment at greater risk?
More generally, it is arguable that the study relied too heavily on standard socio-economic groupings. While these may have relevance in addressing issues such as education, employment, housing or health, they are of doubtful value as measures of vulnerability where PAS is concerned. As the riposte pointed out, 'vulnerability in end-oflife decision-making has been shown to be more related to communicative difficulties, situation, having unrelieved symptoms or a distressing medical condition or being socially undervalued'.
Capacity
Over the 20 years of the DWDA's life an average of 5% of those who ended their lives by PAS had been referred for psychiatric or psychological evaluation. This does not mean that only one in twenty applicants for PAS was so referred. The official reports are concerned only with those who have died by PAS in each year. They do not tell us how many people were referred to a specialist in capacity assessment and had their requests for PAS refused. However, the law is clear: if a doctor has doubts about an applicant's capacity, there must be a referral. Is this happening in practice?
The study referred to above recognized that 'because not all patients who requested assistance were specifically evaluated by mental health professionals and because many cases of depression are missed in primary care, it is possible that some depressed patients received lethal prescriptions'. This observation was confirmed by another study (Prevalence of depression and anxiety in patients requesting physicians' aid in dying: cross sectional survey, Ganzini, L et al, British Medical Journal 2008; 337: a1682) which examined a sample of 58 terminally ill Oregonians who had requested or otherwise expressed an interest in PAS in order to determine the prevalence among them of depression and anxiety. Fifteen of the participants met the study's criteria for depression. Of the 42 participants who had died by the end of the study, 18 had received a prescription for lethal drugs under the DWDA. Three of them met the criteria for depression and had used the supplied drugs to end their lives. None of them had been evaluated by a mental health professional before their participation in the research.
This finding cannot be taken as meaning that one in six of those who end their lives by PAS in Oregon are suffering from depressive disorder. The sample was a small one and a more extensive study might perhaps produce different results. It does however raise concerns that applicants with depressive conditions may be getting through the net and ingesting lethal drugs without receiving the specialist psychological evaluation required by the Act. The study's authors concluded that 'the current practice of the Death with Dignity Act in Oregon may not adequately protect all mentally ill patients'. More recently, the study's principal author, Oregon Professor of Psychiatry Linda Ganzini, has written (Palliative Care and Ethics, Ed. Quill, TE and Miller FG, Oxford University Press 2014, p. 273) that 'this finding supports the need for more active and systematic screening and surveillance for depression to determine which patients should be referred for mental health evaluation'. She notes that 'the proportion of Oregon and Washington PAD (PAD = Physician-Assisted Dying, a term sometimes used instead of PAS) decedents referred for mental health evaluation has remained very low and critics have called for mandatory mental health evaluation in all cases'.
Diagnosis and prognosis
Oregon's law permits PAS for people who have been diagnosed as having a terminal illness. This latter is defined in the DWDA as 'an incurable and irreversible disease that has been medically confirmed and will, within reasonable medical judgement, produce death within 6 months' (ORS 127.800, Section 1 (01)(12)). Over the 20 years of the DWDA's existence 85% of those who died by PAS had been suffering from cancer or amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (known in Britain as Motor Neurone Disease). However, nearly 7% had had what the reports describe as 'other illnesses', which (according to a footnote to the reports) include benign and uncertain neoplasms, diseases of the nervous system, cerebrovascular disease and diabetes mellitus.
These may be 'incurable and irreversible' conditions which will at some stage have a terminal phase. But this latter could occur years after diagnosis and after successive spells of decline and recovery, at one of the low points of which a doctor might possibly say that he or she would not be surprised if the patient died within the next 6 months, especially if the patient were frail and had other comorbidities. The difficulty lies in distinguishing the palliative phase of such illnesses, which may last for years, from the terminal stage, when death is inevitable and imminent. The reports shed no light on how this difficulty is being handled.
Over the period 1997-2016 the median period of time between first request for PAS and death from ingestion of lethal drugs was 48 days (7 weeks). However, this median was within a range of 14-1009 days (from 2 weeks to nearly 3 years).
In other words, while some recipients of lethal drugs have taken their lives on receiving them, others who have been prescribed such drugs on the strength of a 6-months-or-less prognosis have lived for up to 3 years before using them to take their own lives. How long these latter might have lived if they had not been prescribed lethal drugs is impossible to say. Not only does this situation underline the difficulties of accurate prognosis of terminal illness. It also raises the question whether those who postponed taking their lives for so long had had a serious and settled wish to die at the time of their application.
Medical involvement
Oregon doctors may decline to consider requests for PAS. Two out of three of them do so (Palliative Care and Ethics, Ed. Quill, TE and Miller FG, Oxford University Press 2014, p. 270). As a result some, perhaps many, applicants for PAS have to seek out or be introduced to a minority of doctors who are willing to provide the service. Such doctors are unlikely to have any first-hand knowledge of the patient and must proceed largely on the basis of the case notes and what the patient chooses to reveal. Knowing a patient well may not be so important a requirement for the normal purposes of clinical diagnosis and treatment. But the components of decision-making in PAS go beyond the clinical. They include consideration of such issues as how serious is a wish to die, what family or other dynamics might be at work in the background, what, if any, susceptibility exists to mood swings or depression and generally what makes the patient tick.
It is arguable that, if these decisions are to be knowledge-based, the attending doctor at least should have had primary responsibility for the applicant's care for a minimum period of time. Yet the reports tell us that the median length of the doctor-patient relationship for those who died by PAS since 1997 was just 13 weeks within a range of 0-1905 weeks. Oregon's 'doctor-shopping' seems to be accompanied by multiple prescribing-the 2016 report records that one doctor wrote 25 prescriptions for lethal drugs in that year.
End-of-life care
According to the latest official report, nine out of 10 of those who have died by PAS since 1997 had been 'enroled in hospice'. This does not necessarily mean that these patients were being cared for in hospices. Much of hospice care in Oregon is delivered via hospice-at-home programmes, in which patients are visited by doctors or nurses with some palliative care training. Moreover, to qualify for funded hospice care a person must be considered to have 6 months or less to live-the same criterion as for PAS. To enrol in a hospice programme a patient must also waive the right to curative or lifesustaining treatment.
Most surveys seem to be agreed that palliative and hospice care has improved considerably in Oregon over the last 25 years. This raises the question: is there a connection here with enactment of the DWDA? Ganzini has suggested that advocates for palliative care were able to use the spectre of bad publicity, from people choosing legalized PAS because of denial of care, to press for improvements 
Discussion
Numbers
The annual numbers of reported assisted deaths in Oregon do not appear high in isolation. However, it is necessary to remember that Oregon is a sparsely populated State. Its population of around 4 million is less than half that of London. Oregon's 2016 death rate from legalized assisted suicide is the equivalent of some 2000 PAS deaths in England and Wales annually if there were to be a similar law Advocates of PAS argue that legalization delays or replaces some non-assisted suicides and that deaths from PAS cannot simply be added to the total number of other suicides. This may be so, though it is difficult to substantiate or quantify. On the other hand, a recent study (How does Legalization of Physician-Assisted Suicide Affect Rates of Suicide?, Jones DA and Paton, D, Southern Medical Journal, volume 108, Number 10, October 2015) of the interaction between legalized PAS and other suicides in Oregon and neighbouring Washington State concluded that 'the available evidence does not support the conjecture that legalizing assisted suicide would lead to a reduction in non-assisted suicides' and that 'the introduction of PAS seemingly induces more self-inflicted deaths than it inhibits'.
The role of doctors
Another question which arises is the role that is appropriate for doctors in PAS. As noted above, the principal reasons given by those seeking PAS (finding life less enjoyable, desiring autonomy, seeking dignity, wanting to avoid being a burden) are personal or social rather than medical. So long as legalized assisted suicide is tied to specified medical states, doctors obviously have a role to play-to make a diagnosis, offer a prognosis and advise on possible treatments. It is questionable, however, whether they are best-placed to make judgements such as whether an applicant for assisted suicide has a settled wish to die or is free from pressure. This is a particularly important issue in view of the reluctance of the majority of doctors to participate in PAS and the consequent assessment of requests by referral doctors with little or no first-hand knowledge of the applicant. Doctors in Britain seem to recognize this difficulty. A 2015 survey (Medeconnect, May 2015) of 1000 GPs revealed that only 14% (one in seven) would be willing to perform a complete assessment of a patient seeking legalized assisted suicide. The current campaigning for legalization seeks to involve the Family Division of the High Court in the making of assisted suicide decisions. It proposes that the Court should 'confirm' decisions made by doctors.
There is something to be said for placing decision-making with the High Court if assistance with suicide were ever to be legalized in Britain. The Court already examines and rules on other cases involving life-or-death issues-for example, on discontinuation of life-sustaining treatment. However, the hybrid arrangement proposed by those advocating a change in the law has been criticized by the Association for Palliative Medicine of Great Britain and Ireland (APM) as dividing responsibility for the same decision between doctors and the Court. 'It has the potential', wrote the APM in a letter to Members of the House of Lords, 'to produce situations in which each party to an assisted suicide decision takes spurious comfort from the involvement of the other and no one is fully accountable for the outcome'.
The APM's letter continues:
'Doctors' expertise lies in diagnosis of illness, in estimating its likely course and in managing its effects. Dispassionate consideration of complex issues -such as the settled nature of a request for assisted suicide, the weight of personal or domestic issues that may be influencing the request and the person's capacity to make such a serious and irreversible decision -is the proper province of the Court 
Conclusions
The issue of whether assisted suicide should be legalized is a complex one. It covers many areas of expertise, including the law, clinical practice, mental health, society, ethics and disability. It is important to try and see the whole picture and how all the various elements interact with each other rather than to approach the subject from just one or another perspective. Legalization of assisted suicide can also be an emotive subject arousing strong feelings. There are respectable arguments to be made on both sides of the debate. What is important is that discussion should focus on thoughtful and rational analysis of the evidence.
It is also important, as in many other areas of public debate, to be clear about the question before jumping to conclusions about the answers. The question here is not whether 'assisted dying' is compassionate or cruel or whether it is moral or immoral. It is about whether it should be legalized. That calls for an understanding of what the existing law says, why it says it and how it is applied. Before legislatures can responsibly contemplate such a major change to the criminal law as licensing doctors to supply lethal drugs to some of their patients, they need clear evidence that the existing law is unsuitable and, if that is the case, that what would be put in its place would be better. In Britain Parliament has not been persuaded that such evidence exists.
Not all prescriptions for lethal drugs in Oregon result in PAS. Around two recipients in three have used them to take their own lives since 1997. There are, however, some serious questions over the operation of the DWDA. In particular, are doctors the people who should be making judgements which involve personal or social values as well as clinical criteria and where, given the reluctance of most doctors to participate in PAS, the doctors making these judgements often have little or no prior firsthand knowledge of the patients concerned? In any 'assisted dying' regime should doctors not be expert witnesses rather than decision-makers?
There is also the question of whether it is acceptable that a doctor's responsibility should cease when a prescription for lethal drugs has been issued. Releasing such drugs into the community is a serious matter. What assurance can there be that, if a patient takes lethal drugs home for storage and possible use at a later date, he or she does not lose decision-making capacity or come under pressure, whether from others or from within, to use them?
Both these questions are pertinent to a larger one: what arrangements are needed for ensuring that the all-important assessment and decisionmaking process is carried out with rigour and objectivity? It may be that the minority of doctors who assess such requests in Oregon are going about the task conscientiously and with care, but there is no way of knowing for sure that that is so. If they are assessing requests for PAS, who is assessing them? Juvenal's dictum 'Quis custodiet ipsos custodes' ('Who is going to watch the watchers'. Juvenal was a Roman satirist living in the 1st/2nd centuries AD) applies as much here as it does in other walks of life.
It is arguable that pressures to extend 'assisted dying' laws are inevitable where what might be called the natural frontier of the law-the principle that we do not involve ourselves in deliberately bringing about other people's deaths-is replaced by one based on arbitrary criteria such as terminal illness. Such pressures, which have often been discounted by advocates of legalized assisted suicide as scare-mongering, would seem to be emerging in Oregon.
All things considered, Oregon's experience of the DWDA raises questions as to whether legalized physician-assisted suicide can be given a clean bill of health.
